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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the enforcement of desegregation orders 
mandated under state law as a result of the Supreme Court’s handling of 
school desegregation cases at the federal level. The Article tracks the 
development of school desegregation cases starting shortly before Brown 
v. Board of Education and continues through the recent voluntary school 
desegregation case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1. The Article establishes four distinct generations of 
school desegregation cases at the federal level and determines that the 
political tides created, in large part, by the U.S. Supreme Court’s handling 
of federal school desegregation cases severely limited efforts to pursue 
state-mandated school desegregation in the state of Pennsylvania, where 
the Pennsylvania Human Relation Act required the state to remedy even 
de facto school desegregation in Philadelphia. The study reaches this 
conclusion after bringing to bear the fact that the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case also has four generations of court rulings, and those 
rulings align temporally and politically with the four generations of federal 
school desegregation cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the federal government’s rhetoric, it has been less than 
adamant about its commitment to desegregate the nation’s public schools. 
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Although Brown v. Board of Education1 is held as the holy grail of 
desegregation cases, Brown I’s progeny has betrayed the milestone in race 
relations (at least in public schools) set forth by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in 1954. In Brown I, the Court ruled unequivocally that 
segregation would no longer be tolerated in public education.2 However, 
Brown I’s promise has eroded substantially over time. In particular, the 
role of the federal courts in enforcing the nation’s ban on segregation in 
public schools is more questionable now than ever before.3 Since the 
Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley,4 few, if any, Supreme Court cases 
have advanced the cause of desegregation in a meaningful way. Further, 
the Court appears to have redoubled its efforts at retracting the 
advancements of the civil rights movement as those advancements relate 
to the desegregation of public schools. In the 1990s, the Court began to 
unceremoniously bow out of its mandate to assure that public schools were 
desegregated,5 and as recently as the mid-2000s, the Court’s resistance to 
school desegregation manifested itself through the rejection of efforts 
aimed at the voluntary integration of public schools.6  
This study examines the shifting role of the federal courts on the 
holdings of school desegregation cases brought under state law. 
Specifically, this study aligns with the extraordinarily long Philadelphia 
School Desegregation Case (1972–2009), a desegregation case brought 
under state law, with the various eras of federal school desegregation case 
law. This study argues that, based on the results of this Pennsylvania case 
study, the holdings in school desegregation cases at the federal level have 
preempted—politically rather than legally—states’ abilities to achieve 
                                                     
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. See id. at 495; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (stating 
that courts should pursue integration with the public interest in mind); Steven L. Nelson, Different 
Script, Same Caste in the Use of Passive and Active Racism: A Critical Race Theory Analysis of the 
(Ab)use of “House Rules” in Race-Related Education Cases, 22 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 
297, 301–02 (2016) [hereinafter A Critical Race Theory Analysis] (arguing that the Court provided 
more protection for White Americans than for Black Americans in Brown II). 
 3. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, E PLURIBUS… SEPARATION 78–79 (2012) 
[hereinafter THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT], http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-double-
segregation-for-more-students/orfield_epluribus_revised_omplete_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D4R-
B6CE]. 
 4. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See discussion of Milliken I, infra note 
21 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490–91 (1992); see also Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. 
Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991). 
 6. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702–03 (2007); 
see also Erica Frankenberg et al., Fighting “Demographic Destiny”: A Legal Analysis of Attempts of 
the Strategies White Enclaves Might Use to Maintain School Segregation, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 
39 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court, although rejecting the voluntary integration efforts in 
Seattle and Louisville, reaffirmed diversity as a compelling state interest). 
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school desegregation through state-based legislation. Thus, even  
well-intentioned states enacting legislation and remedies for school 
desegregation may fall victim to the political tides set in motion by the 
federal courts. Although legal scholars often cite Sheff v. O’Neill7 as 
evidence of states’ abilities to remedy school desegregation, the 
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case warns of potential dangers in 
relying solely on state law-based attacks of school desegregation. 
First, this study discusses the federal courts’ shunting of efforts to 
desegregate schools. Second, it considers the facts of the Philadelphia 
School Desegregation Case. Third, it explores the similarities of the 
federal school desegregation cases and the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case, with particular attention paid to the more-than-
coincidental similar time points for changes in the course of school 
desegregation at each level. Finally, this study considers whether the 
impact of federal case law on state case law may be a harbinger of things 
to come for future litigants pursuing educational equity through state law-
based efforts to desegregate public schools. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: 
TWO STEPS FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK? 
Immeasurable research has assessed the role of the federal courts in 
school desegregation. Legal scholars’ fascination with the federal courts’ 
impact on movements toward the desegregation of the nation’s public 
schools is well placed, because a substantial portion of watershed cases 
mandating movements toward educational equity through the 
desegregation of public schools has occurred at the behest of the federal 
judiciary. Considering the relatively large number of federal court cases 
(as compared to state court cases) that have addressed educational equity 
through desegregation, it is proper and necessary to evaluate the role of 
the federal courts in desegregation in various eras. 
The first generation of school desegregation cases occurred between 
the 1930s and mid-1950s.8 The second generation of school desegregation 
cases occurred between the mid-1950s and the early-to-mid 1970s.9 The 
third generation of school desegregation cases occurred during the early-
                                                     
 7. In Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the state needed to take measures 
to integrate its public schools). 
 8. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); 
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
 9. E.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin v. Cty. Schl. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Green v. 
Cty. Schl. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 
401 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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to-mid 1970s until the beginning of the twenty-first century.10 Finally, the 
fourth and current generation of school desegregation cases is occurring 
contemporaneously with this study.11 The next part of this study will 
identify the pertinent cases and the driving phenomena belonging to each 
generation of school desegregation cases. 
A. Before Brown I and Brown II: The First Generation of School 
Desegregation Cases 
Before the Supreme Court’s consideration of the segregation of 
Black and White students in public schools, federal courts had already 
considered the segregation of immigrants,12 as well as English language 
learners.13 In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Court set the stage for the 
desegregation of public primary and secondary schools and sent a firm 
message that neither state-sponsored law schools14 nor graduate schools15 
could deny an applicant admission on race alone. Unanimous Court 
decisions, involving extraordinary efforts at consensus building, opened 
educational opportunities previously limited for, if not totally foreclosed 
to, Black students.16 The Court’s period of unanimity continued with 
Brown I.17 In Brown I, the Court explicitly and unequivocally overturned 
the “separate but equal” doctrine18 of Plessy v. Ferguson;19 Brown I 
mandated the replacement of the “separate but equal” policy20 with one 
                                                     
 10. E.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237 (1991); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Co., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); United States v. Scotland Neck 
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); see also 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 11. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 12. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would prevent a school district from 
segregating students with “Mexican blood.” See Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cty. v. Mendez, 
161 F.2d 774, 780–81 (9th Cir. 1923). 
 13. The United States Supreme Court would prevent the state of Nebraska from banning the 
teaching of foreign languages to students who had not passed eighth grade. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
 14. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) (preventing the state of Texas from creating a 
law school for its Black students when the creation of that law school was for the purpose of avoiding 
the integration of its all White law school). 
 15. McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents, 339 U.S 637, 642 (1950) (following its Texas decision with 
a unanimous decision holding that the same constitutional provision forbade the state of Oklahoma 
from mandating that a Black student, admitted to graduate school, be required to sit outside of the 
classroom—although adjacent to the classroom—to maintain segregated learning environments for 
Black and White students). 
 16. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635; 
McLaurin, 339 U.S at 642. 
 17. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18. Id. at 494–95. 
 19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
 20. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494–95. 
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that explicitly required school districts to desegregate their public 
schools.21 Brown I and its remedies version, Brown v. Board of Education 
II—in which the Court told school districts that they must desegregate with 
“all deliberate speed”22—stand among the most prolific and heralded 
Court decisions establishing equity and equality (as defined by school 
desegregation) for Black students in the United States. However, some 
scholars have argued against such a solitary and restrictive method of 
achieving educational equity and therefore are much less praiseworthy of 
society’s interpretation of the school desegregation efforts of Brown I and 
its progeny.23 
B. Desegregation or Bust: The Second Generation of  
School Desegregation Cases 
Soon after Brown I and Brown II, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court 
soundly rejected the state’s argument that the desegregation of the state’s 
public schools was not feasible.24 Throughout the 1960s, the Court 
continued to unanimously rule in favor of school desegregation and 
educational equity for minority students.25 In Griffin v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County, after the district delivered vouchers to 
White families to attend private schools in lieu of attending public schools 
to avoid desegregation, the Court banned the closing of Prince Edward 
County’s public schools.26 In 1968, in Green v. County School Board of 
New Kent County, a unanimous Court required school districts to take 
affirmative acts to desegregate public schools by establishing the Green 
factors (a desegregation checklist) that determined whether meaningful 
desegregation had occurred in a given school district.27 Until the early 
1990s, school districts were required to fulfill these requirements in 
                                                     
 21. Gary Orfield, Prologue: Lessons Forgotten, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION 1, 1–6 (Erica 
Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007) (discussing how school desegregation cases had national 
affect and effect, but the primary area of focus in desegregating schools was in the American South. 
Northerner segregation was, to some extent, not viewed as a problem). 
 22. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 23. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); A Critical Race Theory Analysis, supra note 2, at 
301–02 (arguing that the forwardness and exceptionalism associated with Brown II is a fictitious 
creation of White America). 
 24. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–20 (1958). 
 25. E.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); see also 
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968). 
 26. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31. 
 27. Green, 391 U.S. at 441–42. The Green factors are the racial proportions of students, faculty 
and staff assigned to specific schools as well as absolute equality of transportation, facilities, and 
extracurricular activities. Id. at 435. 
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relative temporal proximity in order to end federal district court 
supervision.28 
C. An End to Affirmative Desegregation Attempts? The Third  
Generation of School Desegregation Cases 
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court began to show signs of 
exhaustion with school desegregation. Although the Court began the 
1970s with unanimous decisions,29 judicial decisions began to split, with 
less of an effort toward consensus building than had occurred in the 1950s 
and 1960s. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, a 
unanimous Court upheld the busing of students to and from school as a 
remedy for de jure segregation,30 while in Wright v. Council of Emporia 
and United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, the unanimity 
of the Court began to dissolve. In these two cases, proponents of school 
desegregation avoided attempts to resegregate (or maintain segregation in) 
public schools.31  
The cracks in the former consensus finally became insurmountable 
in Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I).32 In Milliken I, the Court limited school 
desegregation plans to districts previously guilty of de jure segregation.33 
In this case, a majority of the Court used artificial and arbitrary geographic 
boundaries to draw a line in the proverbial sand of desegregation. Post-
Milliken I, integration-minded school officials were constrained to pursue 
equal educational opportunity while maintaining racial segregation, as 
opposed to using desegregation to effectuate educational equity.34 After 
Milliken I, state statutes pursuing integration became ineffective. 
Moreover, the guidance from Milliken II and other lawsuit remedies aimed 
at increasing financial capital for struggling predominantly minority 
school districts continued to be of little to no avail.35 
                                                     
 28. See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90 (1992); Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation, in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1 (Gary Orfield et al. 
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Turning Back to Segregation]. 
 29. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 30. Id. at 30. 
 31. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. 
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). In both Wright and Scotland Neck, all justices agreed in the result of 
the case, despite the fact that four justices in each case submitted varying rationales for reaching the 
holding in each case. Id. Both cases involved the attempted creation of splinter districts in the wake of 
mandatory desegregation orders. Id. 
 32. Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 33. Id. at 761. 
 34. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977). 
 35. Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 241 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 1996). 
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D. Moving Toward Resegregation: The Fourth Generation  
of School Desegregation Cases 
Although Milliken I was not strong enough to kill efforts at 
desegregating the nation’s public schools, the 1990s saw the Court issue 
multiple rulings that effectively ended affirmative efforts toward school 
desegregation. Combined, Freeman v. Pitts36 and Board of Education of 
Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell37 allowed school districts to 
fulfill one Green factor at a time and to no longer be accountable to federal 
courts upon the piecemeal fulfillment of the individual Green factors. As 
the Court reneged on its promise to desegregate the nation’s public 
schools, there was a simultaneous return to segregation. Research by the 
UCLA Civil Rights Project indicates that the only period of substantial 
school integration was the decade immediately following the enactment of 
the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.38 This same research concluded 
that schools became increasingly segregated in the 1980s;39 since then, 
efforts at school desegregation have slowed, if not completely stagnated 
or regressed. In particular, only the most segregated schools in the 
country—those that are almost exclusively filled with students of one 
race—have seen significant progress; the integration of all other schools 
has severely faltered since the 1980s.40 This finding is unsettling because 
a plethora of literature supports the notion that students in integrated 
schools have better academic, social, and occupational trajectories than 
students in segregated schools.41 
II. STATE COURT INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:  
THE CASE OF PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION V. SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 
Because of their nature, school desegregation cases tend to stretch 
over years, and often decades. The contentious and politically charged 
issues of school and neighborhood segregation engender protracted 
debate; indeed, intentionally lengthening a case may even be a strategy to 
delay an unpopular decision or outlast one’s opponents. Moreover, it takes 
time to discern the extent, causes, and possible solutions to segregation in 
a community. Even when a decision is reached, it takes years to ensure 
that the remedy is effective. In fact, some desegregation cases last such a 
                                                     
 36. 503 U.S. 467, 492 (1992). 
 37. 498 U.S. 237, 245 (1991). 
 38. THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 3, at 3. 
 39. Id. at 18. 
 40. Id. 
 41. E.g., Erica Frankenberg, School Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION 
7 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007). 
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long time that the length of the case influences its trajectory, leaving 
desegregation cases subject to outside influences. Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Commission (PHRC) v. School District of Philadelphia (SDP) 
is such a case, spanning nearly forty years before the parties could reach a 
resolution. The exceptional length of the case is intriguing in itself, but it 
also became a critical factor in its evolution. It changed the goal from 
desegregating Philadelphia’s public schools to providing equal 
educational opportunities for all students in Philadelphia’s public schools, 
even if those opportunities were provided in segregated schooling 
environments. 
A. Contextualizing the Case 
In fact, PHRC v. SDP arose out of the indecision of another long 
case. From 1961 to 1971, Chisholm v. Board of Public Education worked 
its way from state court to federal court, finally ending when a panel of 
federal judges in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals debated whether the 
SDP stood in violation of its own nondiscrimination policy.42 When the 
federal judge dismissed the case without prejudice in the mid-1960s, the 
PHRC refiled in state court in the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania.43 This time, the PHRC chose not to pursue the case under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but instead 
relied on a state statute: the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).44 
The PHRA, passed in 1955, provided for state intervention to resolve 
issues of de jure and de facto segregation.45 In addition, the PHRA 
established the PHRC to resolve violations of the PHRA, including de 
facto segregation46 in public schools.47 
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case spanned nearly forty 
years, but scant attention was paid to school segregation when the case 
was finally resolved. Instead, the PHRC and the SDP settled on a pledge 
to improve school quality. Given the continuing segregation in 
Philadelphia’s public schools, the case seems to have failed its original 
promise of offering Philadelphia’s public school students a desegregated 
                                                     
 42. Dale Mezzacappa, Phila. School Fight Difficult, Enduring, PHILLY.COM (July 11, 2004), 
http://articles.philly.com/2004-07-11/news/25371735_1_Black-teachers-Black-students-Black-
children [https://perma.cc/AV8Q-XQLM]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.; Pennsylvania Human Relations Act of 1955 (PHRA), Pub. L. No. 744, Pa. Laws 222 
(codified as amended at 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951–963 (West 2017)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. In law, de facto segregation indicates segregation that is the result of purported individual 
choices whereas de jure segregation indicates segregation that is the result of explicit government 
policies that promote the alleged segregation. 
 47. See Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n (HRC I), 294 A.2d 410 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1972). 
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education. As the case progressed, minority student enrollment increased 
while White students left the district en masse, making desegregation 
difficult to achieve.48 Table 1 displays Philadelphia’s changing 
demographics over the course of the Philadelphia School Desegregation 
Case. 
 
Table 1 
Racial/Ethnic Demographics Among Entire Population in 
Philadelphia Since 195049 
 
Year White Black Asian Of Latin@50 
Origin 
1950 81.7 18.2 0.1 Negligible 
1960 73.3 26.4 0.2 Negligible 
1970 65.6 33.6 0.3 2.4 
1980 58.2 37.8 1.1 3.8 
1990 53.5 39.9 2.7 5.6 
2000 45.0 43.2 4.5 8.5 
2010 41.0 43.4 6.3 12.3 
 
During each stanza of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case, 
the broader national sentiments regarding school desegregation appear to 
have affected its trajectory. In the 1970s, the PHRC found sympathetic 
jurists and a relatively sympathetic public. Unfortunately, the SDP and the 
PHRC failed to leverage that sympathy in order to reach an agreement to 
integrate Philadelphia’s public schools. Then, in the 1980s, having missed 
the pro-integration attitudes of the 1970s, the PHRC was met with 
desegregation fatigue, if not open hostility, toward mandatory integration 
plans. Judicial efforts at forcing the SDP to integrate failed, and the SDP’s 
independent integration efforts resulted in further school segregation. The 
1990s, fueled by new stakeholders holding even more hostility toward 
desegregation, produced results not initially anticipated in the original 
conceptualization of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case. 
Finally, in the 2000s, desegregation fatigue allowed a settlement that fell 
short of both desegregated schools and the quality education promised to 
the SDP students. 
                                                     
 48. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by 
Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places 
in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76, 2005), https://www.census.gov/ 
population/www/documentation/twps0076/twps0076.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN9U-VETF]. 
 49. Id. at 94 (Table 39). 
 50. The use of the @ symbol affords gender neutrality. 
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B. Prior to the Mid-1970s: The Aggressive Years of State  
Law-Based Desegregation in Philadelphia 
The first major issue facing resolution of the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case was whether the PHRC could legally target de facto 
segregation.51 In a subsequent case, PHRC v. Uniontown Area School 
District,52 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania argued that de facto 
segregation in Pennsylvania was as important as de jure segregation.53 
Agreeing with that contention, Judge Wilkinson of the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania clarified that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
could address issues of de facto segregation through state law— which it 
had done through the PHRA.54 
After the Pennsylvania state legislature passed legislation to rid the 
state’s public schools of desegregation and made the PHRC responsible 
for implementation, the PHRC was empowered to compel the school 
district to remedy de facto segregation.55 According to Judge Wilkinson’s 
opinion, the federal decisions had little to no effect on an enforcement 
action properly brought by an appropriate party under the PHRA because 
federal law did not ban state law from addressing desegregation that was 
the result of explicit state policies.56 
Notwithstanding Judge Wilkinson’s ultimate order enforcing the 
PHRC’s order, the SDP refused to cooperate with the PHRC, leading to 
another iteration of the case.57 According to the PHRC, the SDP failed to 
furnish plans to rectify all or any indications of de facto segregation. The 
PHRC argued that the SDP was unable to finance any plan that would 
result in meaningful integration.58 The Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania dismissed this argument under the reasoning that a plan had 
to be developed before the school district could place a meaningful price 
tag on the plan.59 After developing a plan, the school district could then 
appeal to the PHRC to accommodate the district’s inability to implement 
the best possible integration plan.60 The court ordered the school district 
                                                     
 51. HRC I, 294 A.2d at 411. 
 52. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Uniontown Area Sch. Dist., 313 A.2d 156, 170 (Pa. 1973) 
(arguing that the PHRC had legislative authority to pursue the eradication of de facto segregation and 
that the court was in no position to question the wisdom of the legislature’s actions that are properly 
and constitutionally undertaken). 
 53. Id. at 162. 
 54. HRC I, 294 A.2d at 414. 
 55. Id. at 412–13. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (HRC II), 352 A.2d 200, 209 (Pa. 
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to make appropriate and compliant provisions to remedy its issues with 
school segregation.61 Once again, the state court judges of Pennsylvania 
expressed a sympathetic ear toward the PHRC and the PHRC’s efforts at 
public school integration. 
In contravention of the court’s previous order, by the late 1970s the 
SDP had not developed adequate plans to integrate its schools. Therefore, 
in the late 1970s, the PHRC sought another enforcement action from the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.62 The school district submitted 
plans to the PHRC that rested almost entirely on a voluntary desegregation 
effort—in clear violation of previous requests for long-term involuntary 
reassignment.63 The school district also failed to provide any immediate 
desegregation plans using involuntary reassignment. The SDP’s proposed 
plans also excluded 91 of the 287 (or nearly a third of) Philadelphia 
schools from its integration plans.64 The PHRC, but not the 
Commonwealth Court, found the SDP’s plan unacceptable, especially 
given the numerous extensions, delays, and misgivings previously found 
in this case.65 The Commonwealth Court, though reliably sympathetic to 
the PHRC, hinted in its opinion that the PHRC might have been 
overreaching in enforcing the PHRA.66 Although the court acknowledged 
the PHRC’s frustration, it was unwilling to make the leap to busing, an 
unpopular option for both Blacks and Whites in Philadelphia.67 
Additionally, the PHRC had argued that the voluntary nature of the school 
district’s plan was reliant on the same human capital that initially 
segregated the school district via housing.68 It made no sense to rely on 
those same minds to overcome racial segregation. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
Commonwealth Court in the 1978 case, PHRC v. SDP.69 This installment 
of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case resulted in the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania refusing the PHRC’s demands for 
pairing of schools and busing under the theory that students in Philadelphia 
needed some plan—even if not the perfect plan—to resolve issues with de 
facto segregation.70 The PHRC was required, under this order, to wait until 
the 1980s to institute another enforcement action if the school district’s 
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plan did not produce more integrated schools.71 The move for school 
desegregation in Philadelphia in the 1970s reflected broader national 
trends. In the early 1970s, the courts sided solidly with those pursuing 
desegregation of the Philadelphia public schools.72 As the decade 
unfolded, the Philadelphia desegregation advocates faced some pushback, 
although slightly behind the national backlash. This backlash, though new 
from the courts, had existed for some time in the general population and 
was becoming the new reality for advocates of school desegregation. The 
1980s brought further backlash and, to some extent, signaled the end to 
exclusively desegregation-oriented forces on the Commonwealth Court. 
Although both the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania issued the SDP a reprieve, the 
school district never made good on its promise to integrate its public 
schools.73 
C. Approaching and Navigating the 1980s: State Efforts at 
Desegregation Falter in Philadelphia 
If the mid-to-late 1970s, case law from the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case was a reprieve for SDP (especially in that it required 
that the PHRC give the SDP additional time to attempt to desegregate), the 
1980s case law was nearly a dismissal of the school district’s duty to 
desegregate the city’s public schools.74 While the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania sanctioned the voluntary integration plan in the 1970s,75 the 
voluntary plan resulted in not simply a segregated school district, but in a 
school district that in some ways was more segregated than the district 
previously was.76 In fact, the voluntary integration plan resulted in no 
schools becoming integrated and at least two formerly integrated schools 
becoming segregated.77 While the school district had made some dubious 
progress in integrating the schools, the PHRC, unlike the Commonwealth 
Court, found the progress to be inadequate.78 
Under previous court opinions in the 1970s, the Commonwealth 
Court had approved the PHRC’s rule that a school’s population could not 
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vary thirty percent above or below the city’s population.79 A school outside 
of the thirty percent rule was considered segregated.80 Both the PHRC and 
the school district advanced divergent measures of the voluntary 
integration program’s success.81 Under both the PHRC’s 1968 and 1979 
definitions, the SDP saw marginal gains in integrating the city’s public 
schools.82 Under both of these methods of evaluation, the school district 
saw around a one percent increase in integrated schools.83 The school 
district argued, however, that it had made more impressive gains in 
integration under its own definition. Tables 2–7 enable a comparison of 
each definition’s change in integration. 
 
Table 2 
Schools Integrated Under the PHRC 1968 Definition 
 
Year Integrated 
Schools 
Total Schools Percentage of 
Schools in 
Philadelphia 
Integrated 
1977 51 294 17.3 
1980 57 287 19.9 
 
Note. Under the PHRC’s 1978 definition of a segregated school, a 
segregated school is a school where Black enrollment was not within thirty 
percent of the average Black student enrollment in an SDP school.84 
 
Table 3 
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under 
the PHRC 1968 Definition 
 
Year Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
Total Students Percentage of 
Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
1977 38,644 250,932 15.4 
1980 40,180 224,339 17.9 
 
                                                     
 79. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. 1977). 
 80. Id. 
 81. HRC IV, 443 A.2d 1343, 1344–45 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1344. 
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Table 4 
Schools Integrated Under the PHRC 1979 Definition 
 
Year Integrated 
Schools 
Total Schools Percentage of 
Schools in 
Philadelphia 
Integrated 
1977 30 294 10.2 
1980 37 287 12.9 
 
Note. Under the PHRC’s 1979 definition of a segregated school, a 
segregated school is a school where less than twenty-five percent of the 
students were White or less than forty percent of the students were Black 
unless it contained more than twenty percent Latin@ enrollment. If 
Latin@ enrollment was more than twenty percent, the school is deemed 
segregated if either Blacks or Whites were less than twenty-five percent 
enrollment.85 
 
Table 5 
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under 
the PHRC 1979 Definition 
 
Year Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
Total Students Percentage of 
Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
1977 23,705 250,932 9.4 
1980 26,453 224,339 11.8 
 
 
Table 6 
Schools Integrated Under the School District 1978 Definition 
 
Year Integrated 
Schools 
Total Schools Percentage of 
Schools in 
Philadelphia 
Integrated 
1977 54 294 18.4 
1980 79 287 27.5 
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Note. Under the SDP’s 1978 definition of a segregated school, a 
school with less than 25 percent or more than 75 percent White enrollment 
would be considered segregated.86 
 
Table 7 
Philadelphia Public School Students in Integrated Schools Under 
the PHRC 1979 Definition 
 
Year Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
Total Students Percentage of 
Students in 
Integrated 
Schools 
1977 43,593 250,932 17.4 
1980 62,255 224,339 27.8 
 
If the Commonwealth Court, once solidly in the corner of integration, 
had remained on the side of the PHRC, the court would have demanded 
more of an effort from the school district. Instead, the takeaway from the 
1982 installment of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case was that 
the Commonwealth Court was no longer staunchly in favor of forced 
desegregation. The court, despite evidence pointing to a lack of serious 
effort to overcome de facto segregation, allowed another extension of the 
timeline to remedy public school segregation in Philadelphia—one that 
produced another voluntary plan for integration to begin in 1983, deemed 
the 1983 Modified Plan.87 
Regardless of the definition used,88 the court found the increase in 
integrated schools misleading.89 The court found that no schools had 
joined the rank of integrated schools.90 The percentage increase was 
actually the result of seven schools closing and the students being 
reassigned as a result, and two schools becoming more racially integrated 
due to an increase in other minority students (namely Asians and Latin@s) 
but not from an increase in White students attending the school.91 The 
court, nevertheless, determined another extension of the deadline was 
                                                     
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1354. 
 88. See HRC IV, 390 A.2d 1238, 1262 (Pa. 1978); HRC III, 374 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Commw. 
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necessary to fully desegregate Philadelphia’s public schools.92 In addition 
to proving that desegregation was no longer as high of a priority for the 
Commonwealth Court, the case also proved that the court was no longer 
fully supportive of those seeking to integrate the public schools of 
Philadelphia (even if the court was not in the corner of the anti-integration 
factions, it was no longer reliably pro-integration). 
The judicial actions of the Commonwealth Court during the 1980s 
reflected the general national consensus of frustration with  
integration-related actions. Evidence suggests that the order should have 
better aligned with the desires of the PHRC because the court embraced a 
plan that minimally decreased the number of schools that were racially 
isolated; in fact, the number of schools that were racially isolated 
increased. Instead, the court chose to grant the school district more years 
to remedy the segregation-related issues previously facing Philadelphia’s 
public schools and the segregation-related issues newly created by the 
previous years of desegregation gone awry. The order from the early 1980s 
held until the 1990s and resulted in jumpstarting the next trend: a 
movement away from desegregation toward equal access to public 
education, without regard to the delivery of those opportunities in 
segregated educational environments. In other words, the case would 
move from a Brown I and II-based effort into a Milliken II-based93 effort 
in the next decade. 
D. A New Judge and a New Case: The 1990s and an Opportunity  
Missed for State Law-Based Desegregation in Philadelphia 
As the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case moved into its third 
decade, the PHRC appointed an Independent Settlement Team (the 
Settlement Team) to assess the SDP’s progress toward desegregation.94 
The Settlement Team’s report, released in 1992, confirmed that most SDP 
schools were severely segregated.95 Moreover, the Settlement Team 
concluded that the district had not effectively pursued or achieved 
“maximum feasible desegregation.”96 Ultimately, the Settlement Team 
recommended the use of busing to reassign students and foster racial 
balance.97 Reinvigorated by the report, several representative parent 
groups requested another hearing in April 1993 seeking either to force or 
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to prevent the SDP from implementing busing for integration.98 At this 
point, ASPIRA officially joined the case as a plaintiff-intervenor.99 
ASPIRA, an organization dedicated to developing educational and 
leadership opportunities for Latin@ youth, brought to the case the force of 
a national organization and a broader definition of minority youth who 
could potentially benefit from the case’s resolution. From the beginning 
of the case in the early 1970s to the turning point in the early 1990s, the 
Latin@ proportion of the population had more than doubled; by the ending 
of the case, the Latin@ proportion of the population had increased more 
than five-fold.100 Together, the PHRC and ASPIRA argued that the SDP 
had failed to achieve the maximum possible desegregation and that busing 
was the best option.101 
In response to the new efforts by the PHRC and ASPIRA, the SDP 
attempted to bring contiguous suburban districts into the case, arguing that 
a metropolitan strategy would be necessary to achieve desegregation, a 
tactic that had been rebuffed by the federal court in Milliken I.102 The SDP 
also requested to join the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Governor, 
and the Pennsylvania Department of Education to the case, suggesting that 
state-level political support would facilitate the funding, implementation, 
and enforcement of desegregation plans.103 The SDP then sought 
appropriate compromises with the PHRC, with both parties ultimately 
aiming toward desegregation. Neither the petitioners nor the District yet 
realized that a new judge, Judge Doris Smith, would completely redefine 
the case in a matter of months. 
In June 1993, Judge Smith granted the SDP’s request for a directed 
verdict, concluding that the PHRC had “failed to demonstrate that 
mandatory desegregation measures were feasible.”104 In her opinion, 
Judge Smith cited Judge Wilkinson’s 1972 opinion105 as substantiation 
that “it is the Commission which logically and legally bears the burden of 
adducing evidence in support of its determinations as to the efficacy of a 
plan devised by the District and as to the curative measures needed.”106 
In contrast to earlier judges, who had generally ceded to the PHRC’s 
judgment, Judge Smith demanded a higher burden of proof from the 
PHRC. In doing so, she also established the Commonwealth Court as the 
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final authority on the state of school segregation, rather than the PHRC.107 
Ultimately, the PHRC could not meet Judge Smith’s higher standard. 
Judge Smith faulted the PHRC for taking too long to alert the SDP of 
continued segregation and for inappropriately estimating bus times.108 
Moreover, Judge Smith held that the Commission’s recommendations 
were based on unproven assumptions, concluding that 
the Commission proffered no evidence in support of the proposition 
that mandatory busing would effectuate further desegregation than 
has been accomplished under the modified plan, and it neither proved 
the feasibility of mandatory reassignment per busing nor any cause 
and effect relationship between busing, if indeed it were feasible, and 
increased desegregation.109 
Thus, Judge Smith ruled that the Commission had failed to prove that the 
SDP had not achieved maximum possible desegregation or that mandatory 
busing was a feasible solution. Indeed, she adamantly declared that she 
would “no longer consider mandatory busing as an issue in this case.”110 
Finally, Judge Smith denied the request to involve suburban school 
districts, the Governor, and the Department of Education.111 She cited 
earlier opinions from when the District had attempted to join other parties 
and concluded that the requested parties were neither indispensable nor 
necessary.112 Although Judge Smith left the door open slightly for another 
attempt, she stated, “[i]t should be noted that neither the District nor the 
Commission appealed this Court’s refusal to order creation of a 
metropolitan school district.”113 In either case, precedent in other northern 
urban districts suggested that the inclusion of suburban districts was 
unlikely to succeed.114 The fact that Judge Smith had imposed a heightened 
burden of proof made it even more unlikely that she would pursue a radical 
or unprecedented restructuring of the district. 
Hence, by June 1993, the desegregation case had effectively 
disappeared. Overturning decades of prior opinions, Judge Smith declared 
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the court the final authority on the extent of desegregation, introduced a 
higher standard of proof for the petitioners, dismissed busing as a 
possibility, and denied the involvement of suburban districts or state 
agencies.115 This left the petitioners with a quality of education case; the 
only pathway to educational equity in the SDP would be equal access to 
educational opportunities, even if those opportunities were, in fact, 
segregated.116 Judge Smith’s apparent exchange of desegregation in favor 
of separate but equal educational opportunities117 was not just a betrayal 
of the spirit of the PHRA,118 but also stood in direct opposition to the 
Court’s orders in Brown I119 and its progeny.120 In fact, at the end of her 
opinion, Judge Smith specifically noted that the District’s modified plan 
included goals aimed at educational improvement, and she detailed the 
racial achievement gaps in the District. The judge did not mention 
desegregation.121 As such, Judge Smith established her openness to 
facilitating a case for quality education and therefore shaped the 
petitioners’ new strategies. 
Over the next year, both the PHRC and the SDP appealed the case to 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.122 Both petitions were denied a 
hearing before the Supreme Court in June 1993, and the parties returned 
to Judge Smith’s court.123 The SDP then took advantage of Judge Smith’s 
new perspective on the standards for proving desegregation, and in 
November 1993 moved for a directed verdict that the District had not 
failed to achieve maximum possible desegregation.124 In particular, the 
SDP argued that neither the Commission nor the intervenors had presented 
evidence of busing, school pairings, magnet schools, or any other 
strategies that would have been effective in decreasing segregation.125 
Moreover, the District reiterated that it was financially unable to pursue 
desegregation strategies.126 As such, the SDP suggested “this lengthy 
litigation should be ended by the Court once and for all.”127 
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Although Judge Smith’s weariness of the ongoing battle was 
beginning to show, she denied the request for a directed verdict.128 In 
addition to questioning the extent of possible desegregation, Judge Smith 
also heard arguments as to whether the SDP provided equal educational 
opportunities to minority students.129 The SDP claimed that there was no 
evidence of correlation between segregation and a racial achievement gap, 
a claim that Judge Smith forcefully rejected by opining, “the Court 
categorically rejects the School District’s assertion that disparities in 
educational achievement are irrelevant. To the contrary, disparities in 
educational achievement of students within the School District are one of 
the paramount and most fundamental issues presented in this case.”130 
Judge Smith again asserted the issue of quality education as the principal 
question as opposed to aiming to desegregate the Philadelphia public 
schools, which framed the case quite differently. Judge Smith, thereafter, 
upheld the Commission’s authority to correct de facto segregation, as well 
as its right to use race-based student assignments to do so.131 Indeed, she 
noted the SDP “has a legal responsibility and duty to take steps to correct 
the condition [of school segregation], and its failure to do so constitutes a 
violation of the Human Relations Act.”132 Moreover, she noted that the 
holdings of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, Freeman v. Pitt, and 
Milliken I still allow state courts to remedy de facto segregation.133 
However, Judge Smith reaffirmed her earlier ruling against busing, 
finding that there was no new evidence to establish its feasibility as a 
means to decrease segregation.134 In addition, testimony was presented and 
Judge Smith focused on evidence of unequal educational opportunities 
over evidence of segregation.135 Her summary of the PHRC’s arguments, 
for example, sets aside the complaints of segregation and emphasized 
quality education: 
Despite the Commission’s continued concern for further integration 
of the School District’s schools through mandatory measures, the 
Commission also recognizes that disparate educational opportunities 
must also be addressed, and emphasizes that an important element of 
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any school desegregation case . . . [is to] guarantee a more equitable 
outcome in terms of student achievement.136 
Thus, the PHRC had begun to shift its arguments in response to Judge 
Smith’s leads, balancing desegregation strategies with achievement goals. 
ASPIRA also heavily emphasized inequities, citing “fewer resources 
including, among other things, less experienced and less highly rated 
teachers, older school facilities requiring greater repair, fewer dollars spent 
on educational improvement in these schools” and limited school choices 
for minority students, resulted in lower standardized test scores and lower 
graduation rates in the School District of Philadelphia.137 In response, the 
SDP maintained its claim that any further desegregation efforts would be 
counterproductive, as it had already achieved maximum possible 
desegregation.138 The SDP cited low funds, union restrictions, and the 
additional needs of minority and low-income students as constraints on its 
ability to use funds to improve student achievement.139 
To assess these claims, Judge Smith examined the results of an 
integration plan crafted in the mid-1980s, specifically focusing on the 
“educational improvement” components, explaining that “the Court must 
and shall look to student achievement results, among other things, to 
determine whether an equal educational opportunity has been made 
available to all students within the public schools.”140 Judge Smith noted 
racial gaps in test scores across grades and subjects, as well as in grades, 
graduation rates, and access to Advanced Placement courses.141 She 
concluded that the results 
unequivocally support[] the contention [of the petitioners] . . . race is 
a factor with regard to the levels of academic achievement even 
correlating for other variables . . . . Thus the parties have sustained 
their burden of showing that race is a significant factor in the 
achievement gaps which continue to widen . . . .142 
Yet, Judge Smith also described the findings of researchers and district 
staff, who highlighted highly segregated schools that still fostered high 
levels of academic achievement.143 She concluded that with a strong 
culture of achievement and high expectations for students, schools could 
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overcome the obstacles of segregation and poverty.144 In other words, 
Judge Smith equated the fact that because some students overcame the 
effects of segregation, therefore, all students facing segregation have the 
ability to overcome the same. 
Given the gap between examples of successful schools and the 
average performance of segregated schools, Judge Smith determined that 
the “overall implementation [of the Modified Plan] has been 
ineffective . . . . [A]ll available measures or strategies have either not been 
considered or implemented by the School District which could enhance 
integration of its students and eliminate the racial disparities in 
achievements.”145 Judge Smith listed additional strategies for decreasing 
segregation, including new school construction and strategies for raising 
the academic achievement of minority students, such as strong preschool 
programs, extended school years, and collaboration with community 
groups.146 Unfortunately, the SDP’s actions had been counterproductive 
and even directly opposed to these goals. Ultimately, Judge Smith 
concluded,  
[T]he School District has failed to desegregate the public schools by 
all feasible means and continue[d] to maintain a racially segregated 
school environment where all of the students do not receive equal 
educational opportunities or a quality education . . . . Consequently, 
the Commission’s petition to enforce the law is granted.147 
She ordered the SDP and the PHRC to “discuss the process for 
development of a desegregation plan and timetable for 
implementation.”148 Judge Smith specified elements to be included in the 
plan, namely steps to improve the academic achievement of minority 
students.149 The only elements she named to improve desegregation were 
voluntary school choice measures and the suggestion that new schools be 
constructed in naturally integrated neighborhoods, somewhat tentative 
measures compared to her extensive list of strategies focused on 
achievement.150 
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Subsequent proceedings reinforced Judge Smith’s focus on academic 
achievement.151 Based on testimony by the superintendent and other 
district staff, research on urban school districts, and recent federal 
legislation, Judge Smith emphasized the goal of “reinvesting in public 
school education where the focus is on high academic achievement of all 
students.”152 Judge Smith partly accepted the first proposal, which was 
submitted in November 1994.153 Judge Smith approved recommendations 
for professional development, improved school climate, stringent 
discipline, and monitoring; she partially approved recommendations for 
organizational restructuring, facilities, and for use of resources.154 In 
addition, Judge Smith ordered that the SDP develop plans to promote 
school safety, parental involvement, and “strong basic educational 
skills.”155 Moreover, for the first time, Judge Smith explicitly 
acknowledged the retrenchment of efforts toward desegregation.156 
Development and implementation of the plan proved to be a battle in 
its own right. First, the SDP applied for a stay of Judge Smith’s order, 
which Judge Smith denied in January 1995.157 The PHRC then challenged 
the District’s plan in April 1995, causing Judge Smith to reaffirm her 
requirements.158 She reiterated the need for parental involvement, but also 
added requirements for curriculum revision and a new equity formula 
taking into account a school’s status as racially isolated for purposes of 
resource allocation.159 Rather than seeking desegregation, Judge Smith 
sought to take intractable segregation into account and still improve 
educational outcomes.160 In June 1995, Judge Smith again ordered specific 
improvements to the plan, which called for measures to provide 
professional development, curb absenteeism, and invite community input 
into a restructuring plan.161 
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As the plan developed and the SDP was forced to implement 
additional provisions, the District sought funding to execute the new 
requirements.162 In 1996, Judge Smith at last granted the SDP’s request to 
join the Commonwealth, the Governor, the City of Philadelphia, and the 
mayor in order to determine funding liability.163 Judge Smith concluded 
that the PHRA required the Commonwealth, but not the city, to fund 
remedial orders.164 The Commonwealth and the Governor appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for relief in 1999, and Judge Smith’s 
joinder decision was vacated.165 The SDP, then, was left with a new series 
of requirements but no new funding, support, or enforcement powers. As 
the 1990s drew to a close, so did the lengthy litigation. The SDP developed 
a new plan focused on educational improvement rather than desegregation, 
guided predominately by Judge Smith. Neither the city nor the state was 
willing to or required to fund the new plan, leaving doubts about its 
feasibility and efficacy. But the fate of the case was sealed and hardly 
recognizable to the parties that started the case more than two decades ago. 
E. Placing the Proverbial Nail in the State Law-Based Desegregation 
Coffin: The Case of the School District of Philadelphia in the 2000s 
After a protracted battle over the design of the new plan, the SDP’s 
Comprehensive Safety and Security Plan and Curriculum Renewal Plan 
were approved in 2001.166 Judge Smith found that the plans sufficiently 
addressed historical discrimination while providing minority students with 
equal educational opportunities.167 At long last, the court was satisfied that 
the SDP had made significant efforts and taken all feasible steps to 
improve education for minority students in segregated schools. The School 
Safety and Security Plan, based on input from other large urban districts, 
constituted a “comprehensive approach to school safety.”168 
Measures to improve school climate included security technology, 
systematic collection of school discipline data, and professional 
development on juvenile justice issues.169 Racially isolated schools were 
to have first priority, but the plan was to be phased in throughout the 
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District over two years.170 The plan also specified target outcomes, 
including increased involvement of parents and community partners, 
decreased absenteeism, a revised Code of Student Conduct, data 
collection, and audit procedures.171 The Curriculum Renewal Plan further 
called for the District to develop and implement academic standards in 
core subjects in order to “foster uniformity in instructional practices and 
district-wide coordination in instruction and assessment.”172 The plan 
promised extensive professional development that was focused on helping 
special education students in the general classroom.173 Target outcomes 
for the Curriculum Renewal Plan included reevaluation of textbooks and 
assessments, regular meetings to review student achievement data, and 
targeted professional development.174 
Finally, Judge Smith ordered full-day kindergarten for eligible 
students in segregated schools, literacy interns in elementary schools, and 
school councils in segregated schools.175 Although segregated and racially 
isolated schools were repeatedly mentioned, there were no plans to 
decrease segregation.176 Judge Smith’s order, which was nearly devoid of 
a focus on desegregation of the Philadelphia public schools, betrayed the 
origins of the lengthy case. However, Judge Smith ordered the PHRC to 
monitor the implementation of the various plans and requested closure of 
the case when it was satisfied with the District’s implementation.177 Thus, 
the case began to wind down and responsibility passed back from the 
Court to the SDP and the PHRC. 
The case formally ended in 2009 when the SDP, the PHRC, and 
ASPIRA reached a consent agreement.178 Judge Smith dismissed the case 
with prejudice because the PHRC had withdrawn its complaint. The 
agreement was based on a five-year strategic plan entitled “Imagine 
2014.”179 Imagine 2014 was designed to raise academic achievement of 
minority students so that every child in every Philadelphia classroom 
received an excellent education.180 The SDP identified five priorities that 
would help achieve this goal: quality instruction, school choice, excellent 
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staff, accountability, and improved facilities and operations.181 The 
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case ended without mention of 
desegregation of the city’s schools. At long last, the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case had come to mirror Milliken I and II—school 
desegregation was no longer a sought after remedy.182 The case was now 
about providing students of racial and ethnic minority backgrounds with a 
quality education, even if that had to occur in segregated schools. 
III. MAKING THE CASE: ALIGNING PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS 
COMMISSION V. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA WITH THE 
GENERATIONAL CHANGES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case took a variety of turns 
over its nearly forty-year history. In the 1970s, the case enjoyed general 
success with judges who seemingly sympathized with desegregation 
efforts.183 However, in the late 1970s, the case saw the beginnings of a 
backlash against desegregation efforts, and this backlash led to an era of 
hostility toward integration efforts in the 1980s.184 The 1980s gave way to 
the 1990s when the case met new participants in terms of judiciary and 
plaintiffs.185 These new additions facilitated the resolution of the case but 
only after the purpose of the case shifted from desegregation to equal 
educational opportunities. In the 2000s, the case reached a resolution that 
focused heavily on offering minority students in Philadelphia an 
opportunity that matched those afforded to their White counterparts.186 
This resolution became known as Imagine 2014 and purported to offer five 
targeted improvements to the quality of education to Philadelphia’s 
minority students.187 
New stakeholders, such as Judge Smith and ASPIRA, influenced the 
outcome of the case. Both the duration of the case and the additions in the 
1990s to the plaintiffs and the judiciary played key roles in reshaping the 
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Philadelphia School Desegregation Case. First, the duration of the case 
allowed for the outcomes to be shaped by prevailing trends in school 
desegregation, especially trends influenced by the federal courts’ holdings 
in school desegregation cases. Table 8 lists the changes in the Philadelphia 
School Desegregation Case within the context of the four generations of 
federal school desegregation cases. 
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Table 8 
Timeline of Desegregation Eras for Federal Cases and 
Pennsylvania State Case 
 
Generation of Cases Federal Pennsylvania 
First Generation: 
The Road to 
Desegregation 
Sipuel (1948); Sweatt 
(1950); McLaurin 
(1950); Brown I (1954); 
Brown II (1955)188 
Ending with the passage 
of the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act in 
1955 (PHRA)189 
Second Generation: 
Desegregation by 
Mandate 
Cooper (1958); Griffin 
(1964); Green (1968); 
Swann (1971)190 
SDP v. PHRC (HRC I) 
(1972)  
PHRC v. SDP (HRC II) 
(1976)191 
Third Generation: 
Manifestation of 
Waning Support of 
Desegregation 
Wright v. Council of 
Emporia (1972) and 
United States v. Scotland 
Neck City Board of 
Education (1972); 
Milliken I (1974); 
Milliken II (1977); 
Dowell (1991); Freeman 
(1992)192 
PHRC v. SDP (HRC II) 
(1976)  
PHRC v. SDP (HRC XII) 
(1996)193 
Fourth Generation: 
Explicit Return to 
“Separate but 
Equal”  
Aftermath of Dowell 
(1991) and Freeman 
(1992)194 
PHRC v. SDP (2001); 
PHRC v. SDP (2009) 
(consent order); to 
current195 
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A. New Stakeholders, Altering Results: The Impact of  
Judge Smith and ASPIRA 
The addition of new stakeholders proved to be pivotal to the outcome 
of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case.196 Judge Smith 
immediately expressed her desire to establish equal educational 
opportunities and reverse decades of precedent grounded in theories 
advocating the necessity of school integration. Her efforts to offer quality 
education to all students (instead of fully integrating the Philadelphia 
public schools) were steeped in attacks on the credibility of the PHRC’s 
evidence. Citing erroneous information about transportation times, the 
judge effectively foreclosed one of the primary apparatuses for achieving 
desegregation: busing. Furthermore, Judge Smith made clear that an 
acceptable integration plan would be evaluated by the opportunities to 
achieve academic success. Several hearings and proceedings were 
dedicated to drafting the SDP’s plans for desegregating Philadelphia’s 
public schools. While these plans often mentioned desegregation, their 
core focused on offering minority students an education that was 
comparable to their White counterparts. There were no plans that explicitly 
described how students in Philadelphia public schools would ultimately 
attend desegregated schools. 
ASPIRA’s involvement in the lawsuit gave the PHRC a national 
organization with national resources. ASPIRA’s strategy mirrored that of 
Judge Smith. ASPIRA’s complaint focused on a lack of resources and 
opportunities. Judge Smith was sympathetic to these complaints in the way 
that the earlier judges were sympathetic to the PHRC’s complaints. PHRC 
must have realized that joining forces with ASPIRA and Judge Smith 
would create a three-to-one advantage at the negotiating table. Judge 
Smith constantly and often resoundingly denied arguments against 
potential school desegregation; thus, PHRC had almost no choice other 
than joining the equal educational opportunities bandwagon. The 
Commission faced either a complete loss of quality education for students 
in Philadelphia or offering those same students at least some semblance of 
a quality education in their current environments. ASPIRA’s introduction 
as a plaintiff helped create this shift in the potential outcomes. 
B. The Impact of Time: Aligning the Generational Changes  
in Federal and State Desegregation Cases 
The notion of a four-decade legal case is overwhelming. The wheels 
of justice may turn slowly but seldom as slowly as they did in the 
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case. Comparing the decisions of the 
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case with their contemporary national court cases and school 
desegregation trends, it can be seen that the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case was highly influenced by the prevailing attitudes 
toward school desegregation. At times when the nation—or at least the 
nation’s courts—was pro-integration, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania appeared to be very pro-integration. Following decisions 
such as Green197 and Swann,198 the PHRC found favor with the court. The 
court seemed to rule in favor of the PHRC at every ruling during the early 
1970s. In the early to mid-1970s, the Commonwealth Court often went as 
far as demanding that the SDP make every effort to integrate the 
Philadelphia public schools, notwithstanding the expenses involved. 
However, as the 1970s ended and the decade changed, the country 
tired of desegregation efforts. This attitude affected the decisions of the 
Commonwealth Court. Post-Milliken,199 it became clear that efforts at 
desegregating the country’s public schools would have boundaries. The 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania established those boundaries by 
reining in the previous desegregation demands in the late 1970s and 
ultimately offering great latitude to the SDP in the 1980s—despite 
evidence that the school district, when left to its own devices, further 
segregated the Philadelphia public schools. The 1990s presented new 
challenges as the country believed that integration would not work. This 
philosophy found its way to the courtrooms of the Commonwealth Court. 
Recall that Judge Smith, in the early 1990s, shifted the focus of the case. 
No longer was desegregation a critical part of the case; the new issue was 
whether minority students had equal access to quality learning 
opportunities in Philadelphia’s public schools. 
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case, a state law-based 
desegregation case, paralleled the trajectory of federally based 
desegregation cases. The Pennsylvania state legislature passed the PHRA 
in 1955.200 Not coincidentally, the PHRA arose during the heyday of 
efforts to end segregation and advance movements toward equity for racial 
and ethnic minorities.201 The PHRA afforded the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania an opportunity to explicitly address issues of segregation in 
public accommodations. In fact, the PHRA was much broader than the 
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Court’s mandates in Brown I and Brown II because the PHRA explicitly 
allowed for the state to address de facto as well as de jure segregation. 
The lengthy Philadelphia School Desegregation Case can be 
compared with the second generation of federal desegregation cases. 
During the years immediately following Brown I and Brown II, the 
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case enjoyed persistent and 
consistent attacks on school desegregation; the state court judges from the 
case’s origin to about the mid-1970s accepted few, if any, arguments from 
the SDP on its inability to desegregate public schools. At one point, the 
school district maintained that the desegregation of its public schools was 
not financially feasible. The state courts rebuffed this argument, requiring 
that the school district pursue the desegregation of its public schools 
notwithstanding the alleged financial peril that such desegregation would 
create for the SDP. In particular, the second generation of federal school 
desegregation cases included cases such as Cooper v. Aaron (1958), 
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (1964), Green 
v. County School Board of New Kent County (1968), and Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education (1971).202 In each of these 
cases, school districts argued that the desegregation of the districts’ 
schools was either financially or politically unfeasible; in each of those 
cases, the federal courts—just as the state court in the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case—claims fell on deaf ears. Thus, neither the 
Pennsylvania state court nor the United States Supreme Court would 
accept any defiance of its order to desegregate public schools. 
The third generation of federal school desegregation cases resulted 
in the retrenchment of the federal courts’ efforts toward desegregation; the 
same was true of the Pennsylvania state courts. During the third 
generation203 of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case, the 
Pennsylvania state courts relaxed their no excuses approach to school 
desegregation and began to reason with the school district about the 
feasibility of desegregating the public schools. In the most glaring segment 
of this phase of litigation, the state court entertained whether the school 
district could afford to desegregate its public schools. However, the state 
court mandated that the school district produce some plan to allow for an 
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assessment of the true cost of desegregating the district’s schools. Further, 
the Pennsylvania state courts were unwilling to even entertain the idea of 
costliness; the state courts demanded desegregation of Philadelphia’s 
public schools irrespective of the cost. Federal school desegregation cases 
were experiencing waning judicial support while the Philadelphia School 
Desegregation Case was enduring its loss of support. 
At that time, the Court narrowly sustained desegregation in cases 
such as Wright v. Council of Emporia and United States v. Scotland Neck 
City Board of Education.204 The Court decided both Council of Emporia205 
and Scotland Neck206 by 5–4 majorities as opposed to the unanimity 
enjoyed in the first generation of federal school desegregation cases. The 
third generation of federal school desegregation cases hit its stride with the 
Court’s decision in Milliken I, effectively issuing White suburban parents 
a veto against school desegregation.207 The Court’s decision in Milliken I 
made clear that parents seeking to avoid desegregated schools could 
simply move immediately outside of district boundaries to maintain 
segregated schools. Not surprisingly, Philadelphia (and other cities) faced 
increased White flight and denser minority populations within urban 
school districts post-Milliken I. Milliken I was most effective at preventing 
desegregation because the case substantially limited the number of White 
students available for desegregation efforts while simultaneously banning 
school districts from reaching across district boundaries to capture those 
parents who had now fled to the suburbs. 
In its fourth generation of school desegregation case law, the 
Philadelphia School Desegregation Case followed the fourth generation 
of federal desegregation cases. This generation of cases was marked by 
diminished resolve to desegregate public schools, or desegregation fatigue 
and, most importantly, an apparent acceptance of segregated schools. In 
many ways, the fourth generation of school desegregation cases at both 
levels was a return to separate but equal. Federal school desegregation 
cases, namely Freeman v. Pitts208 and Board of Education of Oklahoma 
City v. Dowell,209 stalled attempts at school desegregation. In fact, Orfield 
argued that the 1990s would go on to excuse school districts from 
desegregation and allow the resegregation of public schools in previously 
court-monitored school districts.210 
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Similarly, this phase of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case 
dismissed desegregation as a viable option for advancing educational 
equity. Instead of school desegregation, Judge Smith set forth equal 
educational opportunities or a modern version of separate but equal. The 
Civil Rights Project has found that public schools in the United States are 
as segregated now as schools were in 1968.211 Similarly, the schools are 
still segregated in Philadelphia. As such, one could conclude that the state 
and federally based school desegregation cases followed similar pathways 
and produced similar results. Moreover, there is little to suggest that equal 
educational opportunities in segregated schools have assisted the academic 
growth of the students of the SDP. 
CONCLUSION 
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case can be divided into 
four phases with each running almost conterminously with a decade. The 
case’s final outcome can be attributed to two factors. First, the introduction 
of like-minded new stakeholders from the judiciary and the general public 
led to a movement away from desegregation and toward equal educational 
opportunities within segregated schools. Likewise, the case’s near-four-
decade duration made the case more susceptible to changing national and 
federal views on school integration that became increasingly unpopular. 
Although it is not possible, given the scope of this study, to articulate the 
origins of shifting public discourse and thoughts on school desegregation 
efforts, there appears to be a correlation between the manner in which the 
federal courts and the Pennsylvania state court handled school 
desegregation cases. Although the federal courts often handled cases 
pertaining to de jure segregation and the Pennsylvania state court handled 
a case pertaining to de facto segregation, the lineages of the cases appear 
on their face to have progressed identically. The addition of new and 
powerful stakeholders and the protracted nature of the Philadelphia 
School Desegregation Case effectively allowed for the shifting of aims of 
the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case and, more importantly, 
curtailed the possibility that students in Philadelphia’s public schools 
would eventually attend integrated schools. 
The Philadelphia School Desegregation Case provides one example 
of the impact of the federal court system on state court systems, 
notwithstanding widely variant designs of desegregation statutes. In some 
ways, the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case calls into question the 
fidelity maintained—or not maintained—in the shared federalism 
assumed among the federal and state governments in the United States. 
                                                     
 211. A Critical Race Theory Analysis, supra note 2. 
2017] Examining the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case 1083 
Likewise, the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case provides a glaring 
example of the dangers of state involvement in governmental and civil 
rights affairs thought to be the province of the federal government. 
Unfortunately, the result of the Philadelphia School Desegregation Case 
suggests that state legislative involvement in desegregation may not be the 
great progressive hope that we desire in terms of racial and educational 
equity. Further, there is little, if any, hope that federal interventions in 
school desegregation will enhance movements toward racial 
desegregation as a means to educational equity given the development of 
federal case law. It is worth returning to the discussion of Sheff212 in this 
context; some states have been better than others at pursuing racial 
desegregation as a means of achieving educational equity. As new 
paradigms in education, law, policy, and politics embrace segregative 
mechanisms,213 it is important that scholars and practitioners assess the 
ability of differing judicial systems to maintain separate, yet coexisting, 
systems of judgment and avoid preemption in the articulation of decisions 
addressing civil rights. 
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